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Notes and Comments
The Island Trees Decision: The
Constitutional Burden of School Boards
I. Introduction
In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico1 a sharply divided Supreme Court af-
firmed a Second Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling which held that
first amendment rights were implicated by a local school board's
removal of books from school libraries.2 Island Trees was the
first Supreme Court decision recognizing the constitutional right
of junior and senior high school students to receive information
within the school environment.$ The decision, although narrowly
drawn, expands the scope of judicial intervention within the
school setting' and encroaches upon the plenary powers of the
local school board.5
1. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
2. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d 404
(2d Cir. 1980). A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the action for a trial on
the respondent students' allegations. Judge Sifton, in announcing the opinion of the
court, said that the case involved "an unusual and irregular intervention in the school
libraries' operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters." Id. at 414-
15. He concluded that the petitioner school board had to show a "reasonable basis" for
interfering with respondents' first amendment rights. Id. at 417. Judge Newman con-
curred in the result. He stated that the case centered on the issue of whether the removal
decision was prompted by the legitimate desire to remove books containing "vulgarities"
and "sexual explicitness" or by the unconstitutional motive of suppressing ideas. Id. at
436-37.
3. See generally Note, Right to Receive Information, 55 TEx. L. REV. 511 (1977).
Although courts had never given it separate consideration, the right to receive informa-
tion has been viewed as the necessary complement to the right of free expression. The
first Supreme Court case to recognize this independent right was Martin v. Struthers,
318 U.S. 141 (1943). See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
4. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct.
2799, 2801 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Island Trees v. Pico].
5. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
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While attending a conference sponsored by a conservative
parents' organization, four members of the Island Trees Educa-
tion Board received a list of objectionable books.6 Nine of these
books were in the Island Trees High School library and one was
in the Junior High School library.7 The Board ordered that the
designated books be removed from the library for review. Re-
acting to school and public pressure, the Board appointed a
book review committee whose final recommendation to the
Board was rejected without explanation. 9 The Board ordered
that one book be returned to the library, to be accessible only
268 U.S. 519, 543 (1925); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) where the Court
declared that "public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local officials." Id. at 101. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) where the Supreme Court noted that it has repeatedly stated that
"the comprehensive authority of the states and of local school officials. . . prescribe and
control conduct in the schools." Id. at 507.
6. Pico v. Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387,
389 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The conference was sponsored by Parents of New York United
(PONYU), a politically conservative group of parents concerned about education legisla-
tion in New York. Id.
7. Id. The nine books in the high school library were: Slaughterhouse Five by Kurt
Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri
Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice
by Anonymous; Laughing Boy by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero
Ain't Nothin' But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver.
The book in the junior high school library was A Reader for Writers edited by Jerome
Archer. Id. at nn.2-3.
8. Id. at 390. When this order was effectuated, the Board sent out a press release
justifying its actions. The books were portrayed as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Semetic, and just plain filthy." Id. The press release concluded that "(i]t is our duty, our
moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral danger as surely
as from physical and medical dangers." Id. The Superintendnet of Schools objected to
the Board's removal on the basis that it was contrary to the procedures established by
the Board. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
404, 409 (2d Cir. 1980). The procedures call for the complaints to go directly to the
Superintendent. He then appoints a committee to study the books and make recommen-
dations. Id. Under N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 1711(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982), the Superin-
tendent of Union Free Schools has the authority to "recommend suitable lists of text-
books and . . . to have supervision and direction over libraries ... under the
management, direction, and control of the board of education." Whether the superinten-
dent's authority includes book removal decisions is left open by the statute. Moreover,
the statute does not describe procedures for book removal.
9. The report submitted by the committee recommended that four books be re-
turned to the libraries, and two be removed. The committee could not agree on the other
four books, but recommended that one be accessible only with parental approval. Pico v.
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 391 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
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with parental approval,1" and that the other nine books be re-
moved.11 Apparently, no Board member had read all of the nine
books;1 2 the members had relied instead on "excerpts" and
"quotations" to reach their decision. 3  Plaintiff students14
brought this action against the School Board charging that its
removal of these books violated their first amendment rights
since it was based on "social, political, and moral tastes" rather
than on the books' lack of educational value.15 The district court
granted summary judgment for defendant, stating that the book
removal "did not sharply and directly implicate first amendment
values.""' The court of appeals, in a two-to-one decision, re-
versed the district court and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.1s
Part II of this Note presents the legal background of the
constitutional issues and educational concerns which were in-
volved in the Island Trees decision. Part III presents the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court justices. Part IV analyzes the reason-
ing of the plurality and dissenting opinions and presents criteria
which aid in shaping the term "educational suitability." Part V
considers the impact of the decision for the courts, educators,
and the public. Part VI concludes that the inability of the jus-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. It is inferred from the facts that no committee member had read all of the
books. The School Board never contested the allegation that the books were removed
solely because they were on the PONYU lists; See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Long
bland Library Association Coalition In Support of Respondents at 5, Island Trees v.
Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
13. Id.
14. The students were represented by their parents as "next friends." Pico v. Board
of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 398. The court declared that the Board had acted in its conservative edu-
cational philosophy and that in its judgment the books were in "bad taste" and therefore
educationally unsuitable. Id. at 396-97. The court continued by stating that although
this philosophy may be misguided, it does not involve a "sharp and direct infringement
of a first amendment right." Id. at 397.
17. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
404 (2d Cir. 1980). The court of appeals noted that "[a] trial is required to determine
what happened, why it happened, and whether ... the School Board's actions. . . cre-
ated a sufficient risk of suppressing ideas to constitute a violation of the first amend-
ment." Id. at 438.
18. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 454 U.S.
891 (1981).
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tices to establish a firm foundation for the right to receive infor-
mation in schools and to provide criteria for shaping the phrase
"educational suitability" undermines this new constitutional
right.
II. Constitutional Rights Within the School Setting
A. Freedom of Expression
Local school boards have long enjoyed expansive adminis-
trative and educational control in the operation of the commu-
nity school system.19 This authority, usually relegated to school
boards through state constitutions, 0 reflects the state's interest
in preparing citizens to function in a democratic society.2" Par-
ents and concerned citizens who serve on school boards are
clearly the most motivated to effectuate the goals and objectives
of the state and community. 2 Occasionally, the definition and
means of implementing state and community aspirations pro-
duce divergent views among the school board, teachers, and stu-
dents.2" This lack of consensus has created the need to look to a
higher, more neutral arbiter, the court, to reconcile these incom-
patible positions.
19. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1711(d)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 1982), which provides:
"The said board of education of every union free school district ... to have in all re-
spects the superintendent, management and control of said union free school"; Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). "By and large, public education is committed to the
control of state and local authorities." Id. at 104.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 which requires the establishment and mainte-
nance of a public school system by the state; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 1 which establishes
that the setting up and operation of public schools is a governmental function of the
state; See also Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
lav. 1092, 1095 (1980).
21. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1976). In that case the Supreme
Court acknowledged the importance of the public schools "in the preparation of individ-
uals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of values on which our society
rests." Id. at 76; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). But cf. Comment,
Challenging Idealogical Exclusion of Curriculum Material: Rights of Students and Par-
ents, 14 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 485, 493 (1979) which questions the Court's decision in
Ambach.
22. See Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L. RaV.
1092, 1097 (1980); Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REv. 321,
344-45 (1979).
23. See Comment, Censorship in the Public School Library-State, Parent and
Child in the Constitutional Area, 27 WAYNE L. RaV. 167, 184 (1980). See generally R.
O'NEIL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIR 110-37 (1981).
[Vol. 3:659
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Although the courts have been reluctant to intervene in the
historical arenas of state and local control, such as education,
they have recognized the obligation to do so when constitutional
rights have been "directly and sharply implicated."' 4 The rights
protected by the first amendment are frequently implicated
when controversies rage over school book selection 5 or the free-
dom of teachers and students to express unpopular views.2' The
first amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech and press27 and its unequivocal language
strongly suggests that state regulation of expression is prohib-
ited.6 Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized
the first amendment's protection of academic freedom.2
The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District declared that "[t]he vigilant protec-
tion of constitutional freedom is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." 0 The issue in Tinker was the
students' right to freedom of expression "in wearing black arm
bands within the classroom in protest of the Vietnam War."'
The Court, in holding that the school's disciplinary action inter-
24. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). "Courts do not and cannot intervene
in the resolution of conflicts. . . which do not directly and sharply implicate basic con-
stitutional values." Id. at 104.
25. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v.
Strongville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v.
Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It operates on
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
28. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). "Because first amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity." Id. at 603-04 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
29. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which the Supreme
Court struck down a New York loyalty oath policy which prevented "subversives" from
teaching in the state's universities. The Court stated: "The classroom is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas. The nation's future depends on leaders trained through wide expo-
sure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." Id. at 603. See generally De-
velopments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 80 HAsv. L. Rzv. 1045, 1054 (1968).
30. 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
31. Id. at 505.
1983]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
fered with the students' right to silent speech, said that students
do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. '1 2 In the majority opinion,
Justice Fortas wrote that for fifty years, the Court has held that
first amendment rights exist for teachers and students within
the school setting:8 3 "Students. . . are 'persons' under our Con-
stitution . . . [and] may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipi-
ents of only that which the State chooses to communicate." 4 Al-
though conceding that under certain circumstances schools may
validly regulate first amendment rights," Justice Fortas de-
clared that in this instance the school has the burden of showing
that the edict against arm bands was prompted by more than
the desire to eliminate the ramifications of expressing a contro-
versial opinion.36
In West Virginia v. Barnette, first amendment considera-
tions overrode a school board's policy which was designed to fos-
ter patriotism. 7 The Supreme Court held that forcing students
to pledge allegiance to the flag was an overstepping of the
board's constitutional limitations."' The Court reasoned that
such action impinged on the intellectual and spiritual domain of
the student which must remain outside the purview of official
control.3'
B. The Right to Receive Information
Although Tinker and Barnette held that the first amend-
ment protections extend to the school environment, 0 the issues
in those cases were confined to the students' right of free expres-
sion.4' The right to receive information has historically been
32. Id. at 506.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 511.
35. Id. at 509.
36. Id. The Court went on to say that when there is no evidence that the questioned
conduct would seriously interfere with the necessary discipline in the operations of the
school the "prohibition cannot be sustained." Id.
37. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38. Id. at 642.
39. Id.
40. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41. In both these cases, the right of free expression was "silent speech"-black arm
[Vol. 3:659
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viewed as the necessary counterpart of free speech 42 although it
was never treated as a distinct right by the courts. The Supreme
Court in 1943 recognized this independent right for the first
time in Martin v. Struthers which held that the first amend-
ment protects the right to distribute and receive literature."
Since then, the Court has espoused varying versions of this
right within several contexts including radio and television
broadcasts," public speeches,'45 and mail distribution." The
common denominator in all these right to receive information
cases was the direct connection between the communicator and
the recipient; the person being denied the information had a di-
rect relationship to the disseminator of this information.
The requirement of a direct connection between the com-
municator and the recipient was modified in a 1976 Supreme
Court decision, Viriginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the Court struck down a
state statute which made it illegal for pharmacists to advertise
drug prices.'7 The Court ruled that a first amendment right to
receive information protects the purchaser's access to informa-
tion on drug prices'" even though there is no direct relationship
between the pharmacist and the buyer. Thus, even an attenu-
ated relationship between the communicator and the recipient
was sufficient to invoke the right to receive information.
Although the dimensions of the right to receive information
have continued to grow, the Supreme Court has never held that
the right extends to the school setting. This lack of guidance
from the Court has left the federal courts split. The Sixth Cir-
cuit and two district courts in the First Circuit have upheld the
right of students to receive information within the school i-
bands in Tinker and not pledging allegiance to the flag in West Virginia.
42. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
44. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
45. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Court recognized the right of citi-
zens to hear a Marxist lecture; however, United States laws governing alien entry into
the country had to prevail).
46. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
47. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
48. Id. at 772.
1983]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
brary. ' e In contrast, the Second and Seventh Circuits have held
that there is no first amendment infringement in the unshelving
of library books.5
C. Federal Court Decisions Upholding the Constitutionality
of Book Removal
Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School
Board, No. 25, decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
was the first case to consider the constitutional implications of
book removal decisions." Initially, the School Board decided to
remove Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas from junior
high school libraries because it contained "explicit sexual inter-
ludes." The Board later modified its decision and retained the
book to be used only on direct parent loans.53 The court, in rul-
ing that the book restriction was constitutionally permissible,
stressed that the first amendment protection was available only
to speakers and writers, and not to recipients. Significantly,
this decision was rendered five years prior to Virginia Pharmacy
which welcomed readers and listeners into the first amendment
embrace.5
Eight years later in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp. the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in dicta, alluded to
the existence of a limited constitutional right of students to re-
ceive information.s According to the court, however, this right
must remain secondary to the primary goal of establishing sound
educational policies.' 7 While the court declared that personal,
49. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail
v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm.
v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
50. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Presi-
dents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
51. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); See generally Note,
What Are The Limits To A School Board's Authority To Remove Books from School
Library Shelves?. Wisc. L. Rav. 417, 446 (1982).
52. Presidents Council, Dist., 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d at 291.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 293.
55. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). It is interesting to speculate that the conclusion in Presidents Council
might have turned out differently if Virginia Pharmacy had been decided earlier.
56. 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 1304, 1305.
[Vol. 3:659
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social, political, and moral views can be the basis for educational
decisions, 58 its holding does not stand for unfettered discretion
of the school board. The court emphatically stated that "rigid
and exclusive indoctrination" ' is unconstitutional although it
did not clarify the factors which would constitute "rigid
indoctrination."
D. Federal Court Decisions Asserting the Unconstitutionality
of Book Removal
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District was the first
case to hold that students have a first amendment right to re-
ceive information within the school environment.6 0 The School
Board had ordered Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle and Joseph
Heller's Catch 22 removed from the high school library,"1 justi-
fying this action on the basis of a quote in the minutes of the
Board meeting which described the books as "completely sick"
and "garbage." ' In holding that the books should be returned to
the library shelves, the court applied the following reasoning:
first, the right to receive information has been well established
since the Virginia Pharmacy decision;63 second, since the ability
to read a book is an important adjunct to the constitutionally
protected right to discuss it, book removal predicated on the
personal, social or political tastes of board members is unconsti-
tutionally blocking both ends of the communication process."
The courts in Right to Read Defense Committee v. School
Committee of Chelsea,"6 and Salvail v. Nashua Board of Educa-
58. Id. at 1306. The court stated the because members reflect the values of their
community, the board must take the responsibility to foster the societal goals which will
permit the students to function in the community. Id. at 1304.
59. Id. at 1306.
60. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 581.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 583.
64. Id. at 582. The court held that book removal was unconstitutional if it was based
on the Board's objection to its content Id. This decision does not take into consideration
the necessity of making decisions on the basis of what is being taught. Moreover, it is not
clear whether the court would have found any interest substantial enough to justify re-
moving the books.
65. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
19831
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tion6 reaffirmed a student's right to receive information in sec-
ondary schools. Both courts also placed a burden on the School
Board to demonstrate a substantial state interest before the stu-
dent's constitutional right could be curtailed. 7
In Right to Read Defense Committee, the Chelsea School
Committee, reacting to a parent complaint about offensive lan-
guage in a single poem, banned an entire anthology of adolescent
writings. 8 Without reviewing the other selections, the commit-
tee chairman unilaterally made the decision to remove the an-
thology. 9 The court noted that not every book removal implicat-
es first amendment rights, but that here, those rights were
affected since the removal was based on the personal and moral
tastes of a school committee." Applying a substantial state in-
terest test, the court held that the board's interest in protecting
students from foul language was not substantial enough to war-
rant a restriction on the right to receive information."
The holding in Salvai72 and the court's interpretation of
what constitutes a substantial state interest was broader than in
Right to Read Defense Committee. In Salvail, a complaint from
a board member prompted a school committee to remove Ms.
Magazine from the high school library.73 After finding that the
removal was politically motivated, ' the court said that the stu-
dent's constitutional right to receive information could not be
restricted since political and social tastes of board members did
not equate with a substantial state interest.7 1
66. 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
67. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703,
713 (D. Mass. 1978); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ. 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H.
1979). The court in Right to Read Defense Committee based this substantial state inter-
est test on the "substantial disruption test" as set forth in Tinker supra note 36. The
court in Salvail followed suit one year later.
68. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703,
708 (D. Mass. 1978).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 712.
71. Id. at 713. The court, in minimizing the state interest, looked at the contested
poem in its entirety to judge its suitability.
72. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
73. Id. at 1272.
74. Id.
75. Id. The court went beyond the personal views of parents. "We do not question
the good faith of the defendants in believing that some parents have been offended. With
[Vol. 3:659
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The necessity of harmonizing the state's role as educator
with first amendment considerations raises complex and emo-
tional reactions.7 ' The issue of which books children read and
who shall make those decisions has generated debate within
many school communities.77 With the controversies showing no
signs of abating and court challenges increasing throughout the
nation,"8 the stage has been set for the Supreme Court's
involvement.
III. The Decision
Clear cut divisions emanated from the Court in the Island
Trees decision. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined Justice
Brennan in the plurality opinion. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment and concurred in part with the reasoning of the
plurality opinion. Justice White concurred in the judgment only.
Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Justices Powell, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor, in turn, each wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined in Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion.79
the greatest respect to such parents, their sensibilities are not the full measure of what is
proper education." Id. at 1275. The holding of the court was diametrically opposite to
Zykan which was decided one year later. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
76. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass), a/I'd, 451 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971).
The secondary school more clearly than the college or university acts in loco
parentis with respect to minors.... Most parents, schoolboards, students and
members of the community usually expect the secondary school to concentrate on
transmitting basic information, teaching the best that is known and thought in the
world, training by established techniques, and, to some extent at least, indoctri-
nating in the mores of surrounding society.
Id. at 1392. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the Court pointed
out that states require that the school boards make choices involving regulation of ex-
pression that the first amendment seems to prohibit. Id. at 95-6.
77. Hechinger, The Essence of Censorship in the Schools, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1981, at C5, cols. 1, 3: "What is wrong and occasionally frightening, is the absence of
effective procedures to decide what materials are to be used. This absence exposes the
schools to tactics of intimidation and encourages censorship by quiet surrender."
78. Calls for Banning of Library Books Rise Sharply Since Reagan Victory, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1980, at A28, col. 2.
79. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2802.
1983]
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A. Plurality Opinion
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality in Island Trees,
stressed that the substantive and procedural issues to be decided
were limited to the following: 1) does the first amendment con-
strain the Board of Education from removing library books from
the Island Trees junior and senior high schools and; 2) if so, do
the "evidentiary materials" which were before the district court,
raise a genuine issue of fact which forecloses summary judgment
for the petitioner School Board?80
In resolving the first issue, the plurality's underlying pre-
mise was that local school boards must have broad discretion to
establish community values and aspirations.8 " Accordingly, there
can be no judicial intervention unless "basic constitutional val-
ues are directly and sharply implicated." ' Citing Tinker v. Des
Moines School District and West Virginia v. Barnette as prece-
dent, Justice Brennan declared that students possess a first
amendment right of free expression."
Justice Brennan then proceeded to show that students' first
amendment rights may be "sharply implicated" by the removal
of library books. 8' According to Justice Brennan, book removal
sets into motion a triad of first amendment principles: (1) the
right to receive information, (2) which follows from the sender's
right to transmit this information, (3) and which is indispensa-
ble to the receiver's right to exercise his freedom of speech.8 5
Justice Brennan utilized the following syllogism: the right to re-
ceive information has been recognized as a first amendment
right by the Court many times beginning with Martin v.
Struthers;" since students have first amendment protection, the
right to receive information must be an inherent part of that
80. Id. at 2806.
81. Id. Justice Brennan cites three cases to establish this concept: Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 101 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 528 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
82. Id. at 4835 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
83. Both of these cases held for a symbolic representation of free expression. See
supra note 41.
84. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2808.
85. Id.
86. Id. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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right.87
Justice Brennan further stated that the School Board's un-
disputed authority over the mandatory classroom situation does
not extend into the library domain.88 Justice Brennan declared
that the Board's concededly substantial role in determining li-
brary content will not rise above constitutional considerations."9
While removal based on educational suitability is clearly permis-
sive,9" removal based on a narrowly partisan or political dogma
translates into an unconstitutional suppression of ideas.9 Jus-
tice Brennan expanded upon this theme by declaring that the
school library is a particularly effective setting to trigger the first
amendment triad.2 Voluntary rather than compulsory, self-en-
lightening rather than limiting, the library is where "a student
can . . . explore the unknown . . . test or expand upon ideas
presented to him in or out of the classroom."93
Justice Brennan concluded by noting that book acquisition
is outside the ambit of this decision. Suppression of ideas is
linked to removal, not the purchase or addition of books to the
library.9 Thus, in answering the substantive constitutional is-
sue, the Court held that "local school boards may not remove
books from school library shelves simply because they dislike
the ideas contained in those books . "..."96
Turning to the procedural issue, Justice Brennan evaluated
the record before the Court and enumerated three factors which
indicate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the Board exceeded its contitutional limitations in re-
moving books from the library:97
87. Id. Justice Brennan quoted President Madison: "A popular Government, with-
out popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both ... " Id.
88. Id. at 2809.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2810. Justice Brennan never explained, however, what he meant by educa-
tional suitability.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F.
Supp. 703, 715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
94. Id. at 2810.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2811.
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(1) no impartial procedures were utilized;
(2) judgment of selected committees and specialists were ig-
nored; and
(3) the books were removed on the basis of personal morals and
tastes."'
Thus, in affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Court re-
manded the case to the district court to resolve the factual is-
sues regarding the Board's reasons for removing the books.
B. Concurring Opinions
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion stated that the
issue is more fundamental than the "right to receive" doctrine as
articulated by the plurality.99 Justice Blackmun asserted that
the state does not have a duty to provide students with informa-
tion. 100 Nor did he find this right interconnected with the nature
of the school library.101 Justice Blackmun focused instead on the
impropriety of the state's "discrimination between ideas" which
arises from hindering access to social or political concepts simply
because of disapproval by state officials.102 He declared that
state action to suppress diversity of thought is inconsistent with
first amendment principles since it may" 'strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.' "103 Thus, Justice Blackmun
minimized two aspects of Justice Brennan's opinion: the exis-
tence of the "right to receive" in the school environment and the
logical connection of this right to the school library.'"
Justice White in his concurring opinion stated that an un-
resolved factual issue existed regarding the reasons for the
Board's removal of the books.1 05 He noted that if the district
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2813-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103. Justice Blackmun declared that the issue is not the right to receive information
but rather that the "state may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state
officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or political reasons." Id. This, in effect, is
the essential component of the right to receive information as articulated by Justice
Brennan.
104. Id. at 2812-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2816. (White, J., concurring).
[Vol. 3:659
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/14
ISLAND TREES
court on remand finds that the books were removed because of
their vulgarity, for instance, the possibility exists that there
would be no appeal.'o Thus, according to Justice White, the
case turned on procedural questions and the constitutional ques-
tions need not have been raised. 10 7
C. Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor, raised four points in his dissent. First, neither
the first amendment nor the Court has ever conferred a "right"
to have the government provide access to library books.108 Jus-
tice Burger stated that the right to receive information and
ideas, previously recognized by the Court, does not spawn the
right to have this information furnished by the government at a
designated place. 0 9 The Court has never held that the govern-
ment has an obligation to provide permanent access to library
books; the first amendment does not imply it." 0
Second, discretionary decisions pertaining to book removal
must be made by a competent authority, such as the school
board, and not the Court."' Justice Burger asserted that school
boards in fulfilling their obligation to instill "fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system,"
must look at book content to evaluate their worth." 2 In so do-
ing, the board is determining the "educational suitability" of the
book, a phrase used by Justice Brennan. According to Justice
Burger, however, "educational suitability" is a standardless
phrase, since any content-based decision regarding a book can
be justified by invoking this term." 3
Third, the parents and not the courts provide the mecha-
106. Id. (White, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 2817. (White, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 2818. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2817. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
77 (1979)).
113. Id. at 2820. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger declared that whenever a deci-
sion-maker judges ideas inappropriate in a book for whatever reason, the term "educa-
tional suitability" will be invoked.
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nism to harness an overactive school board.11 4 Chief Justice Bur-
ger regarded school boards as reflections of grass roots democ-
racy at work: 1 5 "A school board is not a giant bureaucracy far
removed from accountability for its actions; it is truly of the
people and by the people."'1 6 The parents have much input into
the decision-making process of the school system. Not only do
they reflect the attitudes and values of the board members, but
they can influence decisions and remove members from office if
not satisfied with educational programs.1 7
Fourth, the plurality's distinction between book acquisition
and removal is not constitutionally mandated." 8 According to
Justice Burger, if "official suppression" is the constitutional vio-
lation, as the plurality stated, then the removal of a book is no
more or no less suppression than the decision not to obtain it."'
Thus, he reasoned that if the first amendment forbids removal
of a book, it must logically also mandate its acquisition;120
neither proposition is justified on the basis of precedent or an
interpretation of the constitution.' 2'
Justice Powell's dissent reiterated Justice Burger's disap-
proval of a constitutionally based right to receive information in
public schools. 22 He was critical of the fact that when the
Board, in exercising its legitimate function, tried to transmit
fundamental values by removing offensive books, the plurality
translated that into "suppression of ideas.' 2' 3 The Court's hold-
ing, according to Justice Powell, corrodes the authority of school
boards which are the most competent agents to carry out the
114. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 4843 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell drew the reader's attention
to the trial court's summary of excerpts from the contested books which is incorporated
into his opinion. These excepts are from: Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver; A Hero Ain't
Nothing But A Sandwich by Alice Childress; The Fixer by Bernard Malamud; Go Ask
Alice by Anonymous; Slaughterhouse Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; Best Short Stories by
Negro Writers edited by Langston Hughes; Black Boy by Richard Wright; Laughing Boy
by Oliver LaFarge; The Naked Ape by Desmond Morris. Id. at 4843-45.
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state's and parents' interest in educating children."'
After discussing the procedural issues raised by the case, 125
Justice Rehnquist turned to the constitutional issues and noted
the distinction between the state acting as a sovereign and as an
educator. According to Justice Rehnquist, when the government
acts as an educator, at ... the secondary school level, [it] is en-
gaged in inculcating social values and knowledge in relatively im-
pressionable young people .... [tihere are innumerable decisions
to be made. . . . [In] these areas the members of the school
board will act on the basis of their own personal or moral
values.""
To support his contention, Justice Rehnquist relied on
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp. which held that it is
the school board's legitimate function to make choices based on
personal, political, social or moral views. 27 He viewed these cri-
teria as providing the proper basis for a determination of the
educational suitability of a book; a determination within the le-
gitimate discretion of school boards. 28
Justice Rehnquist devoted most of his dissent to the right
to receive information set forth by the plurality. Echoing the
theme of previous dissenters, he could find no support for this
right either in precedent or by analogy.12 9 Justice Rehnquist de-
clared that the cases cited by Justice Brennan to support this
124. Id. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2827 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rule 9(g) of the local rules of the East-
ern District of New York provides:
Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, short and
concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there ex-
ists a genuine issue to be tried.
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate,
short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that
there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Id. n.2.
FED. R. (E.D.N.Y.) 9(g). Justice Rehnquist stated that the only facts that should have
been reviewed were the ones contained in the respondents' Rule 9(g) statement; there-
fore, Justice Brennan's overreach in examining evidentiary materials was inappropriate.
126. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
127. Id. at 2829-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
128. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2830 (Rehnquist, Jr., dissenting).
129. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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right involved neither students nor the educational setting." ' He
also asserted that analogizing the right to receive cases to the
school setting is ineffective for three reasons. First, in the Court
cases articulating the right to receive information, the issue was
total prohibition of ideas; whereas in Island Trees, the students
had alternative sources for these books.1 31 Second, a valid right
to receive does not delineate between book acquisition and re-
moval.3 2 The failure to purchase and the order to remove
equally deny a right to information. Third, although the right to
receive follows from "the sender's first amendment right to
send," it is not logical to pronounce that all authors have a man-
date to have their works placed in the school library. Without
this right, however, the right to receive cannot mature. 33
Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that the term "sup-
pression of ideas," as articulated by the plurality, is too vague to
serve as a guideline in these circumstances. 4 Justice Rehnquist
did not propose that the Constitution permits the suppression of
ideas, but rather that any discretionary action by a school board,
whether in the realm of the classroom or the library, could be
logically labeled suppression of ideas.13 5
Justice O'Connor, in a brief dissent, asserted that the gov-
ernment's role as an educator gives it the right to remove books
concomitant with the power to determine "educational suit-
ability."" 6
IV. Analysis of the Decision
The two concurring opinions and the four separate dissent-
ing opinions reflect the discord that the Island Trees decision
engendered among the justices. The two issues which generated
the sharpest schism were the right to receive information within
the school environment and the definition of "educational suita-
130. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2831-32. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that Justice Brennan
"fails to explain the constitutional or logical underpinnings of a right to hear ideas in a
place where no speaker has the right to express them." Id.
134. Id. at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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bility." All the justices were in accord that educational suitabil-
ity provides legitimacy to the authority of the school board to
remove library books."3 7
A. The Right to Receive Information in Schools
The plurality devoted most of its opinion to establishing the
right to receive information under the first amendment. Justice
Brennan laid the groundwork by effectively substantiating the
first amendment protection of free expression for students, cit-
ing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict 38 and West Virginia v. Barnette.3 9 He then cited several
cases where the Court acknowledged the right to receive infor-
mation within several contexts other than the school setting.1 40
He concluded that since the Court has established that the right
to receive information is a corollary of free expression, and free
expression was upheld for students in Tinker, it necessarily fol-
lows that the right to receive information is available to stu-
dents.1 41 Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, the voluntary
school library is an effective nesting place for this right.1 42
The dissenters focused on three reasons why Justice Bren-
nan's espousal of the right to receive information within the
school setting was without merit. First, Justice Brennan's use of
Tinker as an illustration of the right to receive information
within the secondary schools was inaccurate; second, the accessi-
bility of books elsewhere in Island Trees precluded the assertion
that students are denied a right to receive information; and
third, a government obligation to provide books for students is
illogical as well as not constitutionally required.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent was the most effective in articu-
137. In the opinion, there is no suggestion by the justices that a decision reached on
the basis of educational suitability will not be upheld.
138. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2807 (J. Brennan citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
139. Id. (J. Brennan citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943)).
140. Id. Justice Brennan quoted from Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965) (Brennan, J., concurring): "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a
barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." Id. at 308.
141. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2808.
142. Id. at 209.
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lating the concerns of the minority, particularly on the right to
receive information issue. He, as well as Justice Burger,143 was
critical of Justice Brennan's attempt to glean from Tinker a
right to receive information " thereby establishing the prece-
dent with the school setting. According to Justice Rehnquist, 1"5
although Tinker remains the cornerstone for the first amend-
ment right of free expression for students, it does not stand for a
right to receive information either within the classroom or the
library. Justice Rehnquist's analysis of Tinker seems accurate,
since its opinion is devoid of any mention of a right to receive
information.
A close reading of Tinker and Justice Brennan's opinion,
however, demonstrates that Justice Rehnquist as well as Justices
Burger and Blackmun misstated Justice Brennan's position. Jus-
tice Brennan did not perceive a literal right to receive in Tinker.
Instead, he employed deductive reasoning to effectuate this
right. In order for students to exercise their right of expression
recognized in Tinker, they must be able to receive knowledge
and ideas.' 46
According to Justice Rehnquist, there is another reason why
the right to receive information cannot come to fruition in the
school setting. In Island Trees, the access to the objectionable
books had not been foreclosed. Since students could obtain these
books in public libraries and book stores, the students' right to
receive information has not been denied. 1 7 Justice Rehnquist
noted, however, that in the precedent established by the Court,
the denial of information had to be absolute before the first
amendment was compromised and the right to receive informa-
tion was invoked. 4 8
143. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
144. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2831. Justice Rehnquist goes on to state
"tolne might read Tinker in vain to find any recognition of a First Amendment right to
receive information." Id.
145. Id. The discussion in Tinker was based solely on the students' right to express
their political views.
146. Id. at 2808.
147. Id. at 2831.
148. In First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1981), corporate
opinions on ballot issues not directly involving the corporation were prohibited by Mas-
sachussetts law; in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the issue was whether
potential recipients of Mandel's views were totally denied the "particular qualities inher-
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Justice Rehnquist's criticism is overstated. In Martin v.
Struthers an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of
religious literature did not foreclose the possibility of receiving
the information from another source.149 Yet, the Court held this
ordinance to be an unconstitutional violation of the right to re-
ceive information. 150 The availability of information or literature
from another source was not a factor relied on by the Court in
establishing a first amendment violation. 15 1
Furthermore, in his concurring opinion in the court of ap-
peals decision in Island Trees152 Judge Newman declared that
the "availability of books elsewhere is not decisive." ' He ex-
plained that the image of book burning produces a chilling effect
not because every copy is being destroyed but because of the
symbolic representation of intolerance for opposing views."',
Judge Newman pointed out that the School Board in Island
Trees had used its authority and prestige to indicate dislike for
certain books and that the effect of its decision on a captive au-
dience of impressionable minds should not be underestimated. 55
Justices Blackmun, 15" Burger, and Rehnquist5 a also
faulted Justice Brennan for creating a constitutional mandate
that the State provide access to books. Yet, Justice Brennan
ent in sustained, face to face debate, discussion and questioning"; in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), the statute in issue criminalized all private possession of obscene
material; while in Griswold v.. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the statute had pro-
scribed all contraceptive devices. In Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), the statute
had prohibited door-to-door distribution of religious literature; whereas the statute in
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), required persons receiving commu-
nist propaganda in the mails to affirmatively state their desire to receive this mail.
149. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943). The analogy can be made be-
tween the "special environment" of the school setting in Island Trees and the "special
environment" of the home setting.
150. Id. at 149.
151. Id.
152. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
404, 428 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 434.
154. Id. at n.5. Book burning is not as rare an occasion as one might think. In Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), the books were given
to a local senior citizens group for a public burning.
155. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 638 F.2d
at 433-34.
156. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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neither stated nor inferred that the government must provide
access to books.'59 What Justice Brennan implied was that the
author's right to send and the receiver's right to receive have
ripened through the book selection process. 160 It is not that the
government must provides access, but that when it does, the
right to receive information attaches. Three recent federal court
cases more clearly articulate this concept. In Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School District,6' Salvail v. Nashua Board of
Education,' and the Right to Read Defense Committee v.
School Committee of Chelsea,'63 the courts held that once a li-
brary book had been selected, the school board could not remove
it because its members disliked some of its content.
In Salvail, the court summarized the reasoning of the
Minarcini court in stating that
It is, of course, clear that the Board is required neither to provide
a library for the Nashua senior high school nor to choose any par-
ticular books therefor, but once having created such a privilege
for the benefit of its students, it could not place conditions on the
use of the library related solely to the social or political tastes of
Board members." 4
The court in Right to Read Defense Committee was equally
explicit in underscoring the timing of the right to receive
information:
The Committee was under no obligation to purchase Male and
Female but it did. It is a familiar constitutional principle that a
state, though having acted when not compelled, may conse-
quently create a constitutionally protected interest.'65
In all these cases, the right to receive information had been acti-
vated by the government through the acquisition of the library
books.
159. Id. at 2806-12.
160. Id. at 2801. Justice Brennan stated that "Petitioners possess significant discre-
tion to determine the content of their school libraries, but that discretion may not be
exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner." Id.
161. 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
162. 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979).
163. 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978).
164. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979).
165. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703,
712 (D. Mass. 1978).
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Although the dissent's criticism of this right to receive in-
formation in schools is not well developed, Justice Brennan's
reasoning does raise questions. His analysis, though persuasive,
is unfinished. Justice Brennan's reliance on cases upholding the
right to receive information is misplaced. While these cases do
hold that this right exists, none has involved school children or
the school setting, as Justice Rehnquist emphatically pointed
out."' To deduce a logical nexus to the school setting is not nec-
essarily inappropriate; yet, had Justice Brennan discussed con-
straining factors such as the age of the children, 7 parental pre-
rogatives, 18 and the school functioning as "in loco parentis,"1 19
his opinion would have been more effective.
The age of the children is the qualifying factor which most
merits discussion. Although the Court has held that children are
"persons" under the Constitution,1 7 0 their rights are not deemed
166. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2830-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
supra note 148. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti involved the right of corporations
to make expenditures or contributions to influence ballot issues; Kleindienst v. Mandel
involved the first amendment rights of citizens who wished to hear a Marxist theoreti-
cian; Stanley v. Georgia held that the first amendment prohibits states from making the
private possession of obscene material a crime; Griswold v. Connecticut held that the
right of privacy prohibits states from denying the use of contraceptives; Martin v.
Struthers held that the first amendment protects the door-to-door distribution of reli-
gious literature; Lamont v. Postmaster General, in which Justice Brennan delivered a
concurring opinion, involved the constitutionality of postal statutes.
167. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), in which the court
found that high school students are mature enough to handle disputed materials (issue
here was the word "mother fucker") without harm; but cf. Brubaker v. Board of Educ.,
502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), where the school board dismissed three teachers for hand-
ing out a poem about the Woodstock rock festival to their eighth grade class. The court
upheld the dismissal because (1) there was no connection between the contested material
and the curriculum, and (2) the relative age of the students.
168. See R. O'NmL, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROaSFtR 59-61 (1981); See, e.g., Cornwell
v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), which held that the state's inter-
est in the well being of the child overcame the parent's right to control in the school
setting.
169. Literally the phrase means "in the place of a parent," charged with all the
rights and responsibilities of a parent. The common law doctrine of in loco parentis
meant that parental approval was not necessary to establish a school curriculum which
fulfilled the educational and societal needs of the majority. Comment, School Library
Censorship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Student's Right to Know, 57 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 523, 526 (1980). Today this doctrine has largely been replaced by statutory
regulations of secondary education. See R. O'NE, CLASSROOMS IN THE CROSSFIRE 59-61
(1981).
170. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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to be co-extensive with adults.17 1 The unwillingness of the ma-
jority to broach this issue weakens the foundation of this newly
recognized right to receive information in schools. 17 2
The debate on the right to receive information in Island
Trees is flawed on all sides. The plurality does not dedicate it-
self to examining the issue in detail. The dissenters overstate
their arguments and misstate the plurality's position.
B. Criteria for Determining Educational Suitability
The more difficult question to be settled in Island Trees is
epitomized by Justice Brennan's statement that "discretion to
remove books may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner,' '17 and by Justice Rehnquist's contrary state-
ment that "personal values, morals and tastes" determine
whether a book is educationally suitable. 174 Permissible inculca-
tion versus indoctrination: the fine line separating these method-
ologies must be drawn and standards established if the term
"educational suitability" is to be more than a glittering general-
ity. The opinion in Island Trees, several federal court cases and
the state's role as educator will be relied on to assist in shaping
the contours of this amorphous phrase.
1. The opinion
In the opinion, Justice Brennan acknowledged that school
boards have substantial authority to select library books.17 5 All
the justices were in accord that this authority must be exercised
in respect to the state's objective in transmitting fundamental
values to the student community. 76 Therefore, once the decision
to acquire books is made, there is implicit recognition of educa-
tional suitability which is further buttressed by several pre-
sumptions as to the personnel in the decision making process
and the right to receive information in schools.
The participation of professionals in the evaluation of li-
171. See supra note 167.
172. See supra notes 167-69.
173. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2810.
174. Id. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2809.
176. This proposition was set out in Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
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brary books operates as a check on the school boards if they at-
tempt to impose their own partisan philosophy.17 The standards
promulgated by the American Association of School Libraries
recommend that "each local school board adopt its own written
statement of policy regarding selection procedures which would
. ..specifically delegate the selection of library materials to the
professional staff .... 1 8 Although it is not clear from the Is-
land Trees decision who made the initial decision to acquire the
contested books, it can be inferred that the librarians were the
designated authority.1 7 9 Furthermore, the New York State Edu-
cation Law places the supervision and direction of libraries in
the hands of the superintendent of schools, °80 a professional
educator.
Still another presumption gives rise to an acknowledgement
of educational suitability when library books are acquired. As
was discussed earlier in this Note, the right to receive informa-
tion attaches once the government has made the decision to ac-
quire books.1 8' Where the government has acted in such a way as
to trigger a first amendment right to students, a presumption of
educational suitability logically follows. 82
This presumption of educational suitability cuts into Justice
Rehnquist's argument that personal, social, political and moral
views can validly shape educational suitability. 83 The personal
convictions of concerned laymen who generally comprise school
boards do not hold sway over the professional judgments utilized
in determining library book acquisition. To be sure, underlying
personal values influence both professionals and laymen. Teach-
ers, librarians and school administrators, however, comprehend
the educational need of students; they have been educated and
177. See Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Ex-
pression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 874-82 (1979).
178. Standards of the American Association of School Libraries (quoted in Brief of
Amicus Curiae The Long Island Library Association Coalition In Support Of Respon-
dents, at 20, Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
179. Neither the School Board nor the Superintendent made claims that they were
involved in the initial selection.
180. See supra note 8.
181. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
182. See Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1092, 1117 (1980).
183. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2830.
1983]
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
trained to make evaluations based on educational content. Con-
sequently, objective educational criteria and professional evalua-
tions, rather than personal views, emerge as the dominant fac-
tors in the selection process.
If the acquisition of library books connotes educational suit-
ability and sets into motion a first amendment right for stu-
dents, then an overriding of this educational judgment, evi-
denced by book removal, suggests that noneducational
considerations were operative.18 4 Thus, the authority removing
the books has the burden of showing objective educational crite-
ria if constitutional values are not to be "sharply implicated. '1 85
While not explicitly advancing the motions of presumptions
and objective educational criteria, Justice Brennan did conclude
that the Board's motives were suspect since "established, regu-
lar, and facially unbiased procedures" were not employed. 8 6 The
books were taken from the shelves because they were on a list
containing quotes and limited excerpts from the books. Only one
Board member had read some of the books. Procedures imple-
mented by the Superintendent and the Board were ignored, a
committee which had been established to review the books was
not listened to, and the previous educational evaluation of li-
brarians was not considered in the decision to remove the
books.18 7 To eliminate professionally approved ideas, concepts,
and language within a school library, without utilizing available
administrative procedures and objective educational standards,
is to raise valid first amendment considerations.
2. Federal court cases
To support his position, Justice Rehnquist relied on Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp. which held that educa-
tional suitability can be predicated on personal, social, moral,
and political views.188 The Zykan court, in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the removal of certain books from the high school
184. See Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1092 116-17 (1980).
185. Id.
186. Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2811.
187. Id. Respondents claim that the school board's decision was based solely on the
fact that the books were on the PONYU list was not disputed by the school board.
188. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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library, provided little guidance on how to interpret personal, so-
cial, political and moral views within the context of the case. In-
stead, the court based its conclusion on the following rationale:
that the limited space of the library necessitates periodic re-
moval;189 and that nothing in the constitution prevents educa-
tional judgments from being based on personal views.'90
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Zykan was curious since the
Zykan court neither raised nor resolved any substantive issues.
Undeniably, there are times when book removal is a benign deci-
sion prompted by lack of library space, obsolescence, or student
disinterest. These issues were not present in the other book re-
moval cases, however, and were not present in Island Trees. An-
other weakness in the Zykan opinion is evidenced by the court's
citation of three federal cases that found library book removal to
be a violation of the first amendment. 9 Yet nowhere in the
opinion did the Zykan court attempt to distinguish, critique or
debate any of the issues raised or conclusions reached in these
cases. Instead, the court justified its holding by merely pointing
to two other decisions that have upheld the constitutionality of
book removal.'
The district court opinion in Salvail provides better guid-
ance for identifying the criteria which determine the educational
suitability of a book. 9 In Salvail, the court determined that the
removal of Ms. Magazine from the school library was politically
motivated and, therefore, impermissible. 9" The School Board
protested that the magazine's sexual overtone was the basis for
removal; but the court did not find this argument persuasive
since several other periodicals in the library with similar impli-
cations were not disputed.'95 The court declared that the issue
to be addressed in determining educational suitability is
whether the magazine, "taken as a whole," lacks serious literary,
189. Id. at 1306.
190. Id. at 1308.
191. Id.
192. Id. "We join with these courts in rejecting the suggestion that a particular book
can gain a kind of tenure on the shelf merely because the administrators voice some
objections to its content." Id.
193. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
194. Id. at 1274.
195. Id.
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artistic, political or scientific value. 19"
According to the Salvail court, the process for determining
which books are educationally suitable must begin by evaluating
the books "as a whole. 1 97 The policies and procedures adopted
by the American Association of School Libraries to deal with
complaints on books reflect the same position as the Salvail
court. These policies and procedures recommend that a review
committee read the contested material, check the professional
reviews and evaluate the work "as a whole. '" 98 The necessity of
evaluating a book "as a whole" becomes apparent upon consid-
ering the effects of failure to do so. Evaluated in a vacuum, al-
most any phrase in any book could be subject to disapproval or
censorship. Street language incorporated into a book's content
might be offensive to some, yet be the necessary element in un-
derstanding the rage and despair of certain minority or disad-
vantaged groups within our society. Indeed, the message might
be hopeful and uplifting but unless the book is read in its en-
tirety, that determination cannot be made. 9
3. The state's role
The state's role as educator also sheds light on the proper
criteria for determining educational suitability. The state's in-
terest in "preparing informed citizens capable of functioning in
a democratic society" has been emphasized by the Supreme
Court on several occasions.2 00 This interest runs counter to Jus-
tice Rehnquist's proposition that personal, social, moral and po-
litical views determine educational suitability. For example, a li-
brary tailored solely to a politically conservative philosophy not
only prevents the nurturing of educated citizens but debases the
differing political and social views of other individuals by refus-
ing to give them due recognition. As the Court stated in Island
196. Id. at 1273.
197. Id.
198. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Long Island Library Association Coalition In Sup-
port Of Respondents, at 20, Island Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
199. For instance, the author of a book review on Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver
noted that "[T]here is anger, outrage, bitterness and despair .... Nevertheless the
book is hopeful . . . a plea for a better world . . . for us all." Id. at (A) 3 (quoting
Yamashita, LIBR. J. Oakland Public Library, Calif. (1968)).
200. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Trees,
any word that deviates from the views of another person may
start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution
says we must take the risk. . . [T]his sort of hazardous freedom
• . . is the basis of our national strength and of the independence
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this often dispu-
tatious society.201
According to the Court, dispute and debate lead to the un-
derstanding necessary to be an informed and capable citizen.
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist's assertion that personal views
can determine educational suitability would have been more eas-
ily reconciled with the state's objectives if he had attempted to
qualify or define the permissible intensity and extent of these
personal views.
V. Impact of the Decision
The Island Trees decision is unlikely to have a strong im-
pact on future cases due to the lack of unanimity among the
justices. Shrewd censors and citizens harboring strongly partisan
political and social views may still prevail. They will be able to
couch their objections to books they deem offensive in terms
designed to avoid constitutional confrontations. "Educational
suitability" could become a catchall phrase used by any partisan
group to justify its position.
The decision could also produce more direct attacks on the
book acquisition process. Rules and procedures could be probed
and qualifications of committee members examined in order to
challenge the selection or potential selection of a particular
book.
Nevertheless, this decision does place all interested parties
on notice that there are constitutional limitations on library
book removal and that a cavalier approach to the removal pro-
cess may evoke judicial scrutiny.
VI. Conclusion
The plurality's espousal of the constitutional right to re-
201. bland Trees v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. at 2807 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
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ceive information in schools lacks the careful analysis necessary
to launch this right on an even course. The dissenters are no
more persuasive in their negative appraisal of this right within
the school environment.
Moreover, the Court's inability or unwillingness to grapple
with the forces forming the phrase "educational suitability" un-
dermines this new constitutional right for students. Although
neither the plurality nor the dissenters elucidated these factors;
adherence to procedures established by professionals, the evalu-
ation of literary works in their entirety, and the state's interest
in creating educational objectives best suited to a heterogenous
society, all operate to inject the phrase "educational suitability"
with some relevance.
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